Abstract-With the fast growing demands for the big data, we need to manage and store the big data in the cloud. Since the cloud is not fully trusted and it can be accessed by any users, the data in the cloud may face threats. In this paper, we propose a secure authentication protocol for cloud big data with a hierarchical attribute authorization structure. Our proposed protocol resorts to the tree-based signature to significantly improve the security of attribute authorization. To satisfy the big data requirements, we extend the proposed authentication protocol to support multiple levels in the hierarchical attribute authorization structure. Security analysis shows that our protocol can resist the forgery attack and replay attack. In addition, our protocol can preserve the entities privacy. Comparing with the previous studies, we can show that our protocol has lower computational and communication overhead.
too much about the local hardware cost. Cloud users only need to pay the corresponding fees for their enjoyment of services [7] [8] [9] .
Meanwhile, security issues in cloud big data are also of particular concern [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Because all the data need to be uploaded to the cloud, a large number of security risks are arised. On the one hand, the cloud is managed by the Cloud Service Provider (CSP), which is not a fully trusted entity. On the other hand, the main goal of the CSP is profit maximization. In order to obtain profitability purposes, the CSP may refuse to inform users of possible security risks. Therefore, the big data in the cloud is under many security threats, such as data leakage, illegal access and so on [15] [16] . Because of the particularity of the cloud computing, conventional authentication and key management schemes cannot be directly utilized in the cloud computing [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . It is for the paramount important to design some security assurance schemes for the cloud to ensure the security of the big data.
In the cloud big data security assurance community, several access control schemes have been proposed, which mainly focus on the attribute-based encryption (ABE) to design the schemes [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . In the attribute-based access control system, only users with attributes that satisfy the access policy can access the cloud big data. In fact, users' attributes are distributed by the authority and the access policy is defined by the data owner. It is worth noting that only one authority in the system is not enough in realworld circumstances. In order to improve the security and management efficiency, the method of multiple authorities is put forward to design big data access control schemes [29] [31] [33] [35] . At the same time, a number of hierarchical authorization structures are also presented, which can be used in organizations or companies to meet the requirement of authorization grant right decentralization [36] [37] . In the hierarchical access control system, the root authority distributes security parameters and attributes to domain authorities. After that, domain authorities will distribute the security parameters and attributes to users or sub-domain authorities.
In general, authorities are deemed to be trusted in the hierarchical big data access control system. However, in a small organization, even if each entity is fully trusted, authorities still cannot be protected from being attacked by adversaries. A fake or corrupt authority will destroy the attribute distribution, which will bring many security risks to the system. Hence, it is essential to design a secure attribute authority authentication protocol for the cloud big data access control system.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a secure authentication protocol for hierarchical attribute authorization structure in cloud big data. The main contributions of this paper can be listed as follows:
• We present a secure authentication protocol for the two-level hierarchical attribute authorization structure in the cloud big data access control system to authenticate authorities or users.
• In order to meet big data application requirements, we extend the protocol to support multiple levels authentication in the hierarchical attribute authorization structure.
• With the tree-based secure signature, our protocol can provide security properties of forgery attack resistance, replay attack resistance and privacy preservation.
Related Work
In studies of the access control, researchers mainly focus on the design of attribute based encryption schemes. Goyal et al. in [38] firstly proposed a key-policy attribute based encryption (KP-ABE), which constructs the access policy in the private key. The KP-ABE can well achieve access control for the cloud. Moreover, the KP-ABE is more flexible than the ABE in controlling the user's access. However, because the access policy is built into the private key, the data owner cannot decide who can access the data. Besides, the access policy is exposed to the key generator, which brings many security issues. In 2007, Bethencourt et al. in [39] proposed a ciphertext-policy attribute based (CP-ABE) scheme. On the contrary to the KP-ABE, the CP-ABE constructs the access policy in the encrypted data, which avoids security problems that the KP-ABE brings to the system. Subsequent researches on the cloud data access control are mainly focused on the design of CP-ABE schemes. Currently, new research focuses are how to improve the system's attribute distribution efficiency, scalability and security.
In [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [35] researchers exploit multiple authorities to manage and distribute attributes. Yang et al. proposed the data access control scheme for multi-authority in cloud storage [29] [31], which can support attributes revocation and provide both forward security and backward security. Ruj et al. in [32] proposed the decentralized access control scheme, which can provide anonymous authentication for users while resisting replay attacks and supporting data creation, data modification, reading data stored and user revocation. Besides, Ruj et al.'s scheme is decentralized, which is different from other centralized access control schemes. In [33] , Yang et al. proposed a scheme that supports efficient access control with dynamic policy updating. Because the previous encrypted data and old access policies can be used to achieve dynamic operations, it can prevent the transmission of new encrypted data, which saves much computation resource for data owners.
The decryption of the CP-ABE based access control scheme is not efficient and flexible, so most of access control schemes are not suitable for the cloud to realize the distributed access control. In security communities, the technology of the lowest density maximum distance separable (LD-MDS) can greatly improve the efficiency of the decryption. Note that Huang et al. in [30] exploited LD-MDS to design a fully distributed, scalable and effective data access control scheme. Almost of cloud data access control schemes focus on the data privacy and access control, but the privilege control and identity privacy are ignored. In order to make up for this deficiency, Jung et al. in [35] presented a semianonymous privilege control scheme, which can not only protect the data privacy, but also ensure that a user's identity will not be compromised.
In order to achieve the scalability, flexibility and finegrain, some researchers design the access control based on the hierarchical structure. Unlike the single or decentralized attribute authority structure, the hierarchical attribute authorization structure can reduce the computational cost and security risks. In [27] , Bobba et al. proposed the ciphertext policy attribute set based encryption (CP-ASBE) scheme, which focuses on improving the flexibility of user attributes. Bobba et al. denote user's attributes as a monolithic set and organize them into a recursive set based structure, which is more versatile and can support many practical applications efficiently. Inspired by [27] , Wan et al. in [28] proposed the hierarchical attribute-set-based encryption (HASBE), which combines the ciphertext-policy attribute-set-based encryption (ASBE) with a hierarchical structure. Due to the hierarchical structure, the HASBE is more efficient and flexible in dealing with access control for remote cloud data. Teng et al. in [34] extended the hierarchical attribute-based access control with constant-size ciphertext. Because the length of ciphertext and the number of bilinear pairing are fixed, the scheme is more efficient.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, some necessary preliminaries are presented briefly. In Section 3, the system structure is introduced. In Section 4, the proposed protocol is depicted in detail. In Section 5 and Section 6, the security proof and the performance analysis are described respectively. Finally, the concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some necessary preliminaries are introduced. Firstly, the technology of bilinear pairing is presented, which will be used to construct our authentication protocol. Then, the problem of Computational Diffie-Hellman is described. Finally, the tree-based signature is briefly introduced.
Bilinear Pairing
The bilinear pairing is a novel technology, which has been used in cryptography sine 2001. After the identity-based encryption was proposed in [40] , the bilinear pairing has become more and more popular in constructing security assurance protocols. Here, we give a brief introduction about the bilinear pairing. Firstly, G 0 and G 1 are two multiplicative groups of prime order p. The bilinear pairing can be denoted as e: G 0 ×G 1 →G T . We define some security parameters: G 1 ∈ G 0 , G 2 ∈ G 1 and ∀a, b ∈ Z * p . The properties of the bilinear pairing can be described as follows:
• Bilinear: This is a basic property of the bilinear pairing. It plays an important role in designing security protocols. The bilinear property can be described as
ab .
• Non-degenerate: If G 1 and G 2 are generators of two groups, it can be determined that e(G 1 , G 2 ) = 1.
• Computable: There exists an algorithm that can efficiently compute e(G 1 , G 2 ).
Complexity Assumption
The Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) problem in (G 0 , G 1 , e) can be described as follows:
The Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is (t, ε)-hard. Suppose that G→G 0 , y→G 1 and a ∈ Z * p . For all-time adversaries A, we have
It can be determined that the (t, ε)-CDH assumption holds if no t-time algorithm has the non-degenerate probability ε to solve the CDH problem. Hence, the map e is (t, ε)-secure if and only if the CDH problem is (t, ε)-hard.
Tree-based Signature
In the tree-based signature scheme [41] [42], the message is stored in the bottom of the tree. If the root node wants to authenticate the validity of a message, the signature of the message should be authenticated by corresponding nodes from the low level to the top level of the tree. From the bottom to the root, the parent node verifies its child nodes. The child nodes will authenticate their child nodes in the same manner. The structure of the tree can be seen in Fig.  1 . The main process of the tree-based signature can be explained as follows: KeyGen: This algorithm is responsible for generating some necessary security parameters: public key and secret key. The KeyGen process is listed as follows:
1) The system randomly picks α i ∈ Z * q , Q ∈ G 1 . After that, it selects k for the collision resistant hash function H k . Then, the system calculates Q 1 = (1/α 1 )·Q, ···, Q n =(1/α n )·Q. Here, the n is the branching factor of the tree;
2) The system randomly chooses R, β 0 from G 1 and Z q .
Then, it calculates y = e(R, Q); 3) The public key pair and secret key pair are represented
is denoted as the path from the leaf to the root in the tree, where x j is the i th j child of x j−1 and l denotes the leaf in the last level of the tree. The Sign process is summarized as follows:
1) The system computes the j th node's secret key as x j = y βj . Then, the authenticated value of this node is calculated as
2) The authenticated value of the message is calculated as f = (β l + H k (m))·R; 3) After the calculation of security parameters, the signature of the message is denoted as (f, f l , i l , ···, f 1 , i 1 ). Verify: In the Verify process, the system verifies the signature of the message in the bottom leaf of the tree. The process of Verify is described as follows:
1) The system computes x l = e( f , Q)·y −H k (m) for the bottom leaf l;
2) The system computes
3) The system verifies whether x 0 = x 0 or not. If it holds, the system can determine that the message is legal.
SYSTEM STRUCTURE
In this section, the system structure of our protocol is presented in detail after the introduction of the hierarchical attribute authorization structure. In addition, the entities and corresponding definitions of the system are briefly described.
Hierarchical Structure
The cloud big data access control system is consisted of four entities: attribute authority, data owner, data user and cloud server. The attribute authorization structure is used for the access control system to distribute attributes. Note that the hierarchical attribute authorization structure is a special structure, which is designed to improve the efficiency of the attribute distribution. In the hierarchical attribute authorization structure, authorities can be classified into two types: a root authority and a domain authority.
As is described in [28] [34], researchers define that data owners and data users are managed by domain authorities. The domain authorities are managed by the root authority or their parent authorities. That is to say, the top-level authority or the root authority administrates the lower-level authorities. In [28] , the root authority is considered as a fully trusted entity, while domain authorities are trusted by their sub-domain authorities or users. The hierarchical structure of the attribute authorization for the cloud big data access control system can be seen in Fig. 2 .
Our System Structure
The hierarchical attribute authorization structure can be extended to n depth, which meets the big data requirements. The existing studies usually assume that all the authorities are trusted, which is impossible in practical applications. Hence, an authentication protocol should be designed to authenticate the authorities and users. In this paper, we propose an authentication protocol for the hierachical attribute authorization structure. Here, a novel system structure is constructed, which is an extended n depth of the hierarchical attribute authorization structure in [28] [34] . The entities in the presented system structure can be classified into the following three types, which is shown in Fig. 3 .
• Trusted Root Authority (TRA): The TRA acts as an authorization grant manager. All the attributes are distributed to trusted domain authorities by the TRA. The TRA is a fully trusted root authority. Alternatively, as long as the system is in a state of normal operations, the TRA is always fully trusted.
• Domain Authority (DA): The DA is the domain authority. The DAs in the second level are subordinated to the TRA, while the DAs in the third level are subordinated to the DAs in the second level. All the other DAs in the current level are subordinated to the DAs in the upper level. In addition, users in the last level are subordinated to the DAs in the second level to last. Since the DAs are not fully trusted, they have the possibilities of being attacked. For instance, some adversaries can pretend as valid DAs to take part in the attribute distribution.
• Users (U 1 ,···,U n ): Users are the cloud users who want to obtain attributes from the upper level DAs or the TRA. If one user's attributes can meet the data access structure, he/she can access the big data in the cloud. Here, the goal of users is to obtain attributes from DAs or the TRA. In addition, users are not fully trusted, too. In order to access the big data in the The branching factor of the tree i The number of the current level
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The authentication value of the j th child of the k th node in the i th level of the tree cloud, users will try to obtain more attributes from other DAs.
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, our protocol is presented in detail. The protocol in the structure of two levels is firstly presented, which is designed for a common structure of the hierarchical attribute authorization. In order to meet usage requirements in real-world big data applications, the protocol is then extended to support multiple levels of the hierarchical structure . Notations used in our protocol are showed in TABLE 1.
The Two-Level Structure
In the two-level attribute authorization structure, the TRA is in the first level and users are in the second level. That means the TRA can distribute attributes to users directly.
Hence, in our authentication protocol, the TRA needs to authenticate the arbitrary user who wants to obtain attributes from the TRA. In the signature scheme, the user encrypts his/her data to construct a signature and sends the signature to another user. After the receiver receives the signature, he/she can verify the signature's validity. Actually, the verification processes of the signature can provide the identity authentication. Through checking the validity of received security parameters, the verifier can determine whether the sender is the authorized client or not. In this paper, with the aid of the tree-based signature, we design the protocol to authenticate users or DAs. In the two-level structure of the hierarchical attribute authorization, the TRA needs to authenticate all its child users. Here, user j denotes the j th child of the TRA. Our protocol is consisted of three phases: KeyGen, SigGen and Verify.
KeyGen: This phase is to generate some necessary security keys for the authentication. These security keys are different in every authentication round. The detailed KeyGen process is described as follows:
(1) Within the two-level structure, the TRA and users exchange their security parameters with each other. Firstly, the TRA selects G, v 11j and y from G 0 , Z p and G 1 , which are authorization parameters to assist the generation of the signature and keys. Here, p is the prime order of Z.
Note that v i k j (i≥1, k≥1, j≥1) denotes the public key of the j th child of the k th node in the i th level of the tree. In the two-level structure, the TRA is in the first level and users are in the second level. Hence, when i=1 and k=1, v 11j is the public key of the j th child of the TRA. Of course, these parameters need to be saved securely. The TRA prevents these parameters from being obtained by other entities except the j th user who needs to be authenticated. Then, the TRA transmits (G, v 11j , y) to the its j th child in a secure channel. (2) When the j th child of the TRA receives security parameters (G, v 11j , y), it randomly chooses a secret parameter m from Z p for the collision resistant hash function H m and randomly picks a secret key x i k j (i=1, k=1, j≥1) from Z * p for the signature generation. Note that x i k j (i≥1, k≥1, j≥1) denotes the secret key of the j th child of the k th node in the i th level of the tree. In particular, when i=1 and k=1, x i k j represents the secret key of the j th child of the TRA in the tree. In addition, the j th child of the TRA selects I i k j (i=1, k=1, j≥1) from Z p as its own identity number. Note that I i k j (i≥1, k≥1, j≥1) denotes the identity number of the j th child of the k th node in the i th level of the tree. Similarly, when i=1 and k=1, I i k j represents the identity number of the j th child of the TRA.
SigGen: After the phase of keygen, the j th child of the TRA generates the public key and the signature, which will be transmitted to the TRA for the further authentication.
Suppose that E i k j (i≥1, k≥1, j≥1) delegates the j th entity subordinated to the k th node in the i th level of the tree. When i=1 and k=1, E i k j denotes the j th child of the TRA. The detailed process of SigGen is presented as follows:
(1) The public key of user E 11j is computed as y 11j =y 1/x1 1 j . (2) The identity of user E 11j is blinded in h 11j = H m (I 11j ).
Algorithm 1 Protocol in the Two-Level Structure
The TRA needs to authenticate its j th child TRA:
user E 11j needs to send (f 11j , y 11j , z, h 11j ) to the TRA in a secure channel. Verify: After the TRA receives security parameters from user E 11j , it verifies the authenticity of E 11j . The Verify phase is summarized as follows: (1) The TRA computes an authentication value u 11j = e(G, y) v1 1 j according to its security parameters. Note that these security parameters have been generated in the KeyGen phase. (2) The TRA checks whether the condition e(f 11j , y 11j ) · z −h1 1 j = u 11j is satisfied. If it is satisfied, the TRA can be sure that user E 11j is an authenticated user in this round.
Suppose that all the security parameters and keys are transmitted successfully, and these parameters have not been tampered with by adversaries. The verification process of the authentication can be shown as follows:
= e(G, y) Fig. 4 (a) shows the main process of the presented protocol in the two-level structure. The description of the protocol can be found in Algorithm 1.
The Multiple-Level Structure
In big data applications, especially in a large organization or company, a system with the two-level structure cannot meet the demand of the attribute distribution. With the increase of the number of users, the number of attributes becomes too big. It brings too much overhead to the system if only one authority is engaged. In addition, the system's utilization rate is substantially reduced due to the high management overhead and attribute distribution cost. Hence, in order to decentralize the attribute distribution tasks, the multiple-level hierarchical authorization mode is recommended, which can effectively improve the utilization rate of the system and the efficiency of the attribute distribution.
In the multiple-level hierarchical authorization structure, the TRA manages many DAs. Every DA manages many subDAs or users. The TRA is responsible for authenticating its DAs and distributing attributes to its DAs. Similarly, DAs do the same process to its sub-DAs or users.
The DA needs to authenticate its child E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1). The process of the authentication in the multiple-level structure is described in detail in the following three phases.
KeyGen: This phase is to generate some essential keys for the authentication.
(1) The DA of E (i−1) k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) randomly picks G → G 0 , v i k j →Z p and y→G 1 . Then, the DA of
(2) Similar to the authentication process in the two-level structure, the child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) needs to randomly choose x i k j →Z p * as its secret key. In addition, the child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) randomly picks m and I i k j from Z p , where m is the security parameter for the collision resistant hash function and I i k j is the entity's identity number. SigGen: After the KeyGen phase, the child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) needs to generate the signature and public key for the authentication.
(1) The child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) computes its security parameter y i k j =y 1/xi k j . (2) The child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) conceals its identity number in the collision resistant hash function as h i k j = H m (I i k j ). After that, child E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) calculates the signature f i k j = G xi k j (vi k j +hi k j ) according to the security parameters and keys. (3) The child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) calculates the assistance parameter z = e(G, y) to assist the authentication. Then, the child sends (f i k j , y i k j , z, h i k j ) to its parent DA of E (i−1) k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) in a secure channel. These parameters are prepared for the DA to authenticate the authenticity of its j th child.
Verify: When the DA of E (i−1) k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) receives parameters from its j th child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1), it verifies the validity of these parameters.
(1) The DA of E (i−1) k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) utilizes its own security parameters to compute the authentication value u i k j = e(G, y) vi k j . Here, the DA's security parameters have been generated in KeyGen of this round.
(2) The DA of
where f i k j , y i k j , z and h i k j are received from its j th child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1). After that, DA E (i−1) k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) checks whether the equation e(f i k j , y i k j ) · z −hi k j = u i k j can hold. If the equation holds, it can be sure that the j th child E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) of DA E (i−1) k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) is valid. Otherwise, the child of E i k j (i>1, k>1, j≥1) has been corrupted. We exploit the property of the bilinear pairing to compare two hand sides of the above equation. Suppose that all the parameters are generated and transmitted successfully in the system, and are not tampered with by adversaries.
Algorithm 2 Protocol in the Multiple-Level Structure
The k th DA in the i th level needs to authenticate its j th child DA:
• sends (G, v i k j , y) to its j th child. j th child:
th child is valid.
end if end if
The detailed verification of the left hand side can be solved as follows:
= e(G, y) Fig. 4 (b) shows the main process of the proposed protocol in the hierarchial attribute authorization structure of the multiple-level. Algorithm 2 shows the detailed descriptions of the protocol in the multiple-level structure.
SECURITY PROOF
In this section, some related security theorems of our protocol are given and corresponding proofs are presented.
Theorem 1: Our proposed authentication protocol is (t, ε/(n+1), m)-secure in resisting the forgery attack.
With the bilinear paring in the authentication protocol, our protocol can resist the forgery attack. In order to demonstrate the security, we analyze it based on the collisionresistant function. The definitions of the collision-resistant function and the collision-finding algorithm are described as follows:
• Collision-resistant function: Suppose that the function
k is the set of (t, ε)-collisionresistant functions. The advantage of finding a collision by any t-time algorithm can be denoted as
Here, ξ 1 = ξ 2 , λ is randomly generated from η.
• Collision-finding algorithm: Suppose that there is an algorithm which can find the collision for e: G 0 ×G 1 →G T . We define that there exists an equation:
When an adversary forges an equation and tries to find the collision, he/she needs to solve the equation e(G , P 1 ) (a) The two-level structure (b) The multiple-level structure Fig. 4 : The processes of our protocol = e(G 3 , P 3 ). We define e(G 3 , P 3 ) = θ. Here, G is a given parameter, and P 1 , P 3 ∈ G 1 and G ∈ G 0 .
Proof of Theorem 1. There are two types of forgeries in the system. For one thing, if j=l, it means that the user was authenticated by using the u l . Suppose that the f is the signature of the H(I ). We have e(f, y) · z −Hm(I) = u l and e(f , y)
· z −Hm(I ) = u l . Hence, we can get z Hm(I)−Hm(I ) = e(f /f , y). For another, if j < l, we denote that E i k j is the j th child of the
, it can be determined that there is a collision in the hash function. Otherwise, we have θ t = e( f , y), where t = 0. As the description in the above forgery information, the θ = e(G 3 , P 3 ). The probability of y = P 1 is 1/(n+1). Therefore, it is not easy to solve e( f 1/t , P 1 ) = e(G , P 3 ). That is to say, if one adversary wants to forge a valid user, he/she needs to find a collision in the hash function and the bilinear paring. However, to the best of our knowledge, the assumption is not correct in security communities. Hence, our authentication protocol can resist the forgery attack.
Theorem 2:
In the authentication phase of our protocol, one entity cannot use previous security parameters to pass its parent's authentication. It means that the proposed authentication protocol can effectively resist the replay attack.
We define that an entity E * i k j who has been authenticated by the its parent in an attribute distribution round. After this round, the entity of E * i k j needs to pass the authentication again. However, the entity E * i k j has not received authentication parameters from its parent. Hence, entity E * i k j will exploit the previous security parameters to try to pass its parent's authentication.
Proof of Theorem 2. In the two-level structure, suppose that user E * 11j possesses security parameters (G * , v 11j * , y * ). These security parameters have been sent by the TRA to the user of E * 11j in the previous round. Then, the user E * 11j
and f * 11j = (G * )
After that, the user of E * 11j transmits (f * 11j , (y * ) 1/x1 1 j , z * , h 11j ) to the TRA. When the TRA receives security parameters from the user of E * 11j , it computes u 11j = e(G , y ) v 1 1 j . Here, G , y and v 1 are security parameters that the TRA generates in the current round. Finally, the TRA verifies the validity of the e(f * 11j , y * 11j )·(z * ) −h1 1 j . The equation can be solved as follows:
If the user has been authenticated, the e(f * 11j , y * 11j ) · (z * ) −h1 1 j should equal to the u 11j , which means that e(G * ,
Obviously, they are not equal. The parameters (G, v 11j , y) are randomly picked by the TRA in every round, which can well protect the system against the replay attack.
In the multiple-level structure, the replay attack resistance method likes descriptions in the two-level structure. Suppose that an entity E * i k j tries to use previous parameters (G * , v i k j * , y * ) to pass its parent's authentication. Firstly, entity E *
to its parent. After the parent of E * (i−1) k j receives these parameters, it needs to compute u i k j = e(G ,
Here, G , y and v i k j are new security parameters in this round. Then, the parent E * i k j verifies whether e(f *
The left hand side of the equation can be solved as follows:
Due to the usage of random numbers, the equation cannot hold. That is to say, the user or DA who possesses previous security parameters cannot pass its parent's authentication in the multiple-level structure. Hence, we can conclude that our protocol can resist the replay attack.
Theorem 3:
Our protocol can well protect the entities' identity in the authentication process, which means that our protocol can provide the property of privacy preservation.
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of the identity information of users or entities must be considered in the design of a security assurance protocol [43] .
Proof of Theorem 3. In our protocol, the information of the identity is hidden in the hash function. If an entity wants to pass its parent's authentication, it needs to randomly pick a m for the collision resistant H m . As described in [44] , the hash function is the one-way function, that is to say, it is not reversible. Hence, the system can well preserve the entity's privacy when its parent verifies its validity.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the comparison of our protocol with the HASBE [28] is given. And simulation results of the HASBE and our protocol are presented in terms of the computational and communication overhead.
Theoretical Analysis
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of our protocol, we compare the computational and communication overhead of our authentication protocol with that of the HASBE.
Suppose that E., Add., H., Mul. and P. are the operations of exponentiation, addition, hash, multiplication and bilinear paring. On the one hand, we compare the HASBE and our protocol in terms of the computational cost. We count the number of operations in the key and security parameters generation phases of the HASBE [28] . From TABLE 2, we can find that the computational cost of the HASBE is 26E.+3Add.+2H.+3Mul.+1P.. Because the HASBE mainly relies on the the technology of random masking, the amount of operations is very large. Note that the tree-based signature is utilized to design the authentication process in our protocol. Due to the feature of the tree-based signature, our protocol has less computational cost. From TABLE 2, we can see that the computational cost of our protocol is only 3E.+1Add.+2H.+1Mul.+2P.. Compared to the HASBE, the computational cost of our protocol is dramatically reduced. In particular, the cost of exponentiation operations in our protocol is reduced by 8 times compared to that in the HASBE.
On the other hand, we compare the communication cost between the HASBE and our protocol. The l G and l Zp denote the size of parameters that belong to the group and the finite field. Here, we focus on the comparison of the communication cost in the security parameters exchange phase. From TABLE 2, we can learn that the communication cost of the HASBE is 8l G + 8l Zp . Due to the decentralization authentication, our protocol has lower communication cost. From TABLE 2, we can find that the communication cost of our protocol is 4l G + 4l Zp . Compared to the HASBE, the communication cost of our protocol is significantly reduced.
Finally, we can conclude that our protocol is more efficient than the HASBE in terms of the computational and communication cost.
Simulation of the Overhead
We simulate the HASBE and our protocol [28] in Matlab. The simulation is implemented on a computer that runs From Fig. 5 , we can see that the time cost of the key generation in our protocol is almost a constant value. That is to say, with the increase of the number of users, the time cost of the key generation is kept nearly unchanged. In contrast to the key generation, with the increase of the number of users, the time cost of the authentication is an exponential growth. However, the time cost of the authentication is still within an acceptable level. Fig. 6 depicts simulation results of the HASBE and our protocol. The amount of the experimental data in the simulation is from 1000 KB to 2000 KB. From Fig. 6 (a) , we can see that the computation time of the HASBE and our protocol increases with the growth of the amount of the experimental data. It is worth noting that the computation time of the HASBE increases more rapidly than that of our protocol. Moreover, in the condition of different amounts of the experimental data, the computation time of the HASBE is always larger than that of our protocol.
In order to quantify the whole communication overhead, the bit lengths of two types of parameters l G and l Zp are set as 120 bits and 8 bits, respectively. Fig. 6 (b) shows that the communication overhead of the HASBE and our protocol increases with the growth of the amount of the experimental data. From Fig. 6 (b) , we can find that our protocol brings less communication cost to the system. Through the simulation results of the overhead, we can conclude that, compared to the HASBE, our protocol substantially improves the performance in terms of the computational and communication cost.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a secure authentication protocol for hierarchical attribute authorization structure, which is inspired by the tree-based signature. Our protocol cannot only be used in the common situation of the two-level structure, but also well used in the multiple-level structure of the hierarchical attribute authorization. The security analysis shows that our protocol can provide the forgery attack resistance and the replay attack resistance, as well as the property of privacy preservation. In the performance analysis, we compare our protocol with the HASBE. Observed from simulation results, our protocol has lower computational and communication overhead, which has a promising future in secure authentication in cloud big data. 
